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PAUL G. HARRIS*

Collective Action on Climate Change:
The Logic of Regime Failure
ABSTRACT
The internationalclimate regime, primarily designed to limit the
emissions ofpollutantscausingglobal warming,hasfailed. Why has
international cooperation to combat global warming been so
difficult, and what factors must change to improve the situationassuming it is even possible? Using Mancur Olson's classical
theory of collective action, this article endeavors to explain the
failure of the climate regime. Other internationalenvironmental
agreements and the associated regimes, such as the Mediterranean
Action Plan and the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion,
demonstrate that collective action to addressinternationalenvironmental problems is possible. Both agreements contain the
ingredients that classical theory suggests are necessary to achieve
collective action. But the flipside of collective action theory- that
collective action in largergroups is very difficult or unlikely- can
also apply to international agreements and action on climate
change. Despite the Mediterranean and Montreal successes,
relatively speaking,and in spite of so much effort over two decades
to createan effective climate regime, it is by no means apparentthat
the elements for success will exist for the foreseeablefuture. We
should expect a continued muddling along that may, at best, reduce
slightly-but not reverse-global warming at some point in the
relatively distantfuture. Climate change is with us to stay.
It is now patently clear that the world is facing a growing set of
environmental dangers. The greatest among them is probably climate
change -changes to Earth's climate system, manifested in events such as
drought, floods, sea-level rise, major temperature rises in some regions (e.g.,
the Artic) and potentially precipitous falls in others (e.g., Europe), extinction
of species, and spread of pests (to give but a sampling of the myriad
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adverse impacts of climate change).' Climate change arises from global
warming, which is caused by humankind's pollution of the atmosphere
with greenhouse gases (GHGs), notably carbon dioxide coming from the
burning of fossil fuels. 2 This human-induced global warming was, until
recently, viewed as afuture problem. However, there is now a realization
that ongoing climatic changes are very probably consequences of global
warming.3 The international legal instruments intended to avert dangerous
interference with the Earth's climate -the stated aim of the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) - are increasingly about mitigating
that dangerous interference and putting in place mechanisms for adapting
to it.
International cooperation is required to address climate change
because it is caused by pollution originating in countless locations in every
country of the world, and its consequences will be so harmful that only with
international assistance will the weakest and poorest peoples and states be
able to adapt to future environmental conditions. Climate change is a
collective action problem par excellence. As Duncan Snidel points out, "The
problem of international cooperation is essentially one of collective action
4
applied to the particular circumstances of the international system."
Although there are many constraints that tend to limit collective action,
especially among disparate states, there have been a few instances in which
international environmental cooperation has been relatively successful.
Among these are the Mediterranean Action Plan (Med Plan) for reducing
pollution of the Mediterranean Sea and the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, an agreement for limiting damage to the
earth's protective layer of stratospheric ozone. Climate change has required,
and will continue to require, similar international cooperation, but on a
much greater scale.
About two decades ago, governments came to recognize the need
for just such cooperation, and in 1992 most of them signed the FCCC. The
core objective of the FCCC is
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a
level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to

1. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY (2001).
2. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE

2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS (2001).
3. Editorial, Climate Change Is All Around Us, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 18 2006.

4. Duncan Snidel, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implicationsfor International
Cooperation Regimes, 79 AM. POL. So. REV. 923, 923 (1985).
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ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.'
Diplomats subsequently negotiated the Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC,
which requires developed country parties to reduce their emissions of
GHGs by about five percent below 1990 levels by 2012.6 However, not all
developed countries are parties to the Kyoto agreement. Most notably, the
United States, the source of about one-quarter of the pollutants causing
global warming, has refused to ratify the agreement (although the Clinton
administration signed the treaty in 1992) and, over the last half decade7
under President George W. Bush, has sought to undermine it at every turn.
Scientists tell us that emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs
must be cut by at least 60 percent just to stabilize their concentrations in the
atmosphere and to prevent chaos in the global climate system.8 Yet, even
with full implementation as negotiated among the parties, the Kyoto
Protocol will result in reductions of well under five percent of parties'
emissions because the manner in which parties are allowed to meet their
commitments (e.g., emissions trading and land use changes [carbon sinks])
will not in fact result in significant national emissions cuts. The Kyoto
Protocol is, at best, a small (but potentially very important) baby step
toward greater action. In the meantime, global GHG emissions will continue
to rise precipitously, notably because large developing countries (especially
China and India), along with the United States, will be increasing their use
of fossil fuels as their economies grow. Climate change will continue,
virtually unabated, short of new, much more aggressive collective action to
reduce GHGs. However, strong signals of the more robust action needed
are distinct in their absence. The most that can be expected at present is a
muddling along that will, at best, slightly reduce global warming at some
point in the relatively distant future. Despite the Kyoto Protocol entering
into force in February 2005, the climate regime has been a failure.
What explains this failure? Why has international cooperation to
combat global warming been so difficult, and what factors must change to

5. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992,
availableat http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
6. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), Annex B, Dec. 11, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/kpeng.pdf.
7. BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, 1 GLOBAL WARMING IN THE 21sT CENTURY: OUR EVOLVING
CUMATE CRISIS 118-24 (2006).
8. World Resources Inst., The Difficulty of Stabilizing Emissions, in WORLD RESOURCES
1996-97: THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT, available at http://population.wri.org/pubscontent_
text.cfm?ContentlD=792. Some scientists, notably the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory's
Wallace Broeker, argue that GHGs must be brought to zero later in this century. BBC World
Service, Global Business, Jan. 2, 2005.
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improve the situation-or is significant improvement even likely? Using
Mancur Olson's theory of collective action (CAT),9 this article endeavors to
explain the failure of the climate regime to stabilize, let alone significantly
cut, emissions of GHG pollutants. The Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol
demonstrate that classical CAT is applicable to international environmental
problems. Both agreements contain some of the ingredients that Olson says
are necessary to achieve collective action. But the flipside of the theory that collective action in large groups is unlikely - also applies to international environmental cooperation. Despite the Mediterranean and
Montreal successes (at least compared to climate change), it is by no means
apparent that the elements for success will exist for climate change in the
foreseeable future.
Other theories could be brought to bear, and indeed have been, to
show the complex, multi-level factors shaping cooperation on transnational
environmental issues, including climate change.1" But even basic attributes
of cooperation highlighted by CAT are lacking in the climate regime, while
the obstacles highlighted by the theory are manifest. Classical CAT, despite
its limits, was enough to predict the failure of climate regime even in its
earliest days, and it points to some issues that need to be addressed as more
complex frameworks are used to find ways of provoking the much greater
cooperation that is required in the future. One primary aim of this article,
then, is to show that the climate regime faces some of the most fundamental
obstacles to cooperation. This is not to say that all of the research on
international environmental cooperation (including my own, I hope") that
has gone well beyond classical CAT has been for naught. To the contrary,
many of the answers to this collective action problem are indeed found in
domestic politics, multiple levels of analysis, and so forth. But the focus of
these newer approaches is a bit like explaining the integrity of a building by
focusing on its occupants and furnishings, or at its internal walls and the

9.

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIc OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).

10. As examples of a growing literature, see EDWARD L. MILES ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIME EFFECrVENESS (2002); John Barkdull & Paul G. Harris, Environmental Change and
Foreign Policy: A Survey of Theory, 2 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 2, 63 (2002); Matthew Paterson,
Theoretical Perspectives on International Environmental Politics, in PALGRAVE ADVANCES IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 54 (Michele Betsill et al. eds., 2006); and EUROPE
AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Paul G. Harris ed., 2007).
11. See, for example, books from the Project on Environmental Change and Foreign
Policy: Paul G. Harris, INTERNATIONAL EQUITY AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2001);
CLIMATE CHANGE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Paul G. Harris ed., 2000); THE
ENVIRONMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Paul G. Harris ed.,

2001) ; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (Paul G. Harris ed., 2002) ; GLOBAL
WARMING AND EAST ASIA (Paul G. Harris ed., 2003) ; CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (Paul G. Harris ed., 2004); EUROPE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 10.
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personalities of neighbors, while ignoring that it lacks a proper foundation
and is built on loose ground. Classical CAT is no longer cachet among
students of global environmental politics, to be sure, but it is still quite
helpful in explaining why international cooperation and the development
of robust international law on climate change - or, more precisely,
international action to do something about it -remain extremely difficult.
It helps bring us back to basics.
The remainder of this article consists of five sections. The first
section describes a number of features of Olson's CAT. The second and
third sections look at the Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol, with
emphasis on some of the factors that contributed to relatively successful
collective action in those areas. The fourth section examines the issue of
climate change and references CAT to explain the lack of a more robust
international regime to prevent it. Fifth and finally, prospects for the climate
regime are discussed. Some of the "early" literature on climate change
cooperation from the late 1980s and early 1990s is cited here to show that
literature from that period was prescient in anticipating the difficulties of
collective action, demonstrating that it is possible to predict the likelihood
(or not) of collective action in this issue area, despite all of the complicated
theoretical work done in recent years.
COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY
On the final page of the oft-cited Theory of International Politics,
Kenneth Waltz reaffirms the importance of collective action: "collective
efforts are needed if common problems are to be solved or somehow
managed." 2 He acknowledges that "global problems can be solved by no
nation singly, only by a number of nations working together"13 and
reaffirms the need to garner an understanding of collective action and the
extent to which it is possible in relations among states. The notion of the
collective action problem is not a new one. Rousseau describes it in his
Second Discourse when he writes of "the rare occasions when common
interest should make [a man] count on the assistance of his fellow men....14
In his well-known story of the stag hunt, Rousseau explains that men could
acquire the
idea of mutual engagements and of the advantages of fulfilling them, but only insofar as present and perceptible
interest could require; for foresight meant nothing to them,

12.

KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLmcs 210 (1979).

13. Id.
14. JEAN-JACQUEs RoussEAu, THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOuRSES 144-45 (Roger D.
Masters & Judith R. Masters trans., 1964) (1750).
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and far from being concerned about a distant future, they did
not even think of the next day. Was it a matter of catching a
deer, everyone clearly felt that for this purpose he ought
faithfully to keep his post; but if a hare happened to pass
within reach of one of them, there can be no doubt that he
pursued it without scruple, and that having obtained his
prey, he cared very little about having caused his companions
to miss theirs.1 5
Thus Rousseau introduces the difficulty of undertaking collective action.
In the introduction to his seminal work, The Logic of CollectiveAction,
Mancur Olson points to a commonly held belief: assuming that they are
rational, self-interested actors, everyone in a group with a common interest
will act collectively to achieve that common interest.16 But, as Olson shows,
this is actually not the case; empirical evidence does not support this
apparently logical view of collective action.' Absent incentives separate
from the good being sought, rational actors will not necessarily act
collectively to achieve a common good that they all have an interest in
obtaining. This is true even if the actors involved have reached a consensus
on what the good is and how best to achieve it (a condition that is,
astonishingly, still absent from the climate change question, at least in the
United States where there are still influential climate skeptics -President
George W. Bush apparently among them - who discount the problem while
finding it increasingly difficult to deny its importance). As Olson argues,
"unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there
is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their
common interest, rational,self-interestedindividuals will not act to achieve their
common or group interests."8
To explain this phenomenon, it is useful to highlight some of the
underlying logic and principles associated with Olson's theory. A
"common" or "collective" good is one that is available to every individual,
regardless of whether or not he or she pays for it. Collective goods have two
characteristics: "if they are available to one country they are available to all
countries (access cannot be restricted), and one country's use of the good
does not reduce its availability to others."' 9 Collective goods are those that
are characterized by "jointness" of supply and the impossibility of
exclusion.2" There is an interest in the protection of collective goods -a

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 145.
OLSON,supra note 9, at 1.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 2.

19.

PETER M. HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 253 n.7 (1990).
20. RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1982).
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stable climate system-from collective "bads," namely atmospheric
pollution and its consequences. As Russell Hardin indicates, "collective
action problems, especially those that are political issues, have as their best
outcomes the elimination of harm rather than the provision of good or
goods."2'
Even if there is a common interest in a collective good being sought
by a group, there is seldom a common interest in paying for that good. Each
member of the group wants other members to pay the costs of providing it
because, by definition, each member will benefit from the good regardless
of whether or not he or she pays for it. As Waltz characterizes it, "all have
reason to hang back, hoping that others will bear the costs - something that
nobody may have an incentive to do." 22 According to Oran Young, "rational
egoists operating in the absence of effective rules or social conventions often
fail to realize feasible joint gains and end up with outcomes that are
suboptimal (sometimes dramatically so) for all concerned."' Furthermore,
Hardin suggests, "many of those who want their collective interests to be
served may weigh their own self-interests heavily, even too heavily to
cooperate in serving their collective interests." 24
Some scholars believe that cooperation is somewhat easier than
Olson's CAT suggests. For instance, Robert Keohane has said that, although
cooperation is rare in world politics, it is possible even among rational, selfinterested actors if they are concerned about their reputations or if an
international institution exists to facilitate cooperation. 25 The question is
whether pressure can be brought to bear effectively and what those
institutions must look like to bring about cooperation.
Using Olson's definition, a "group" is understood to mean "a
number of individuals with a common interest." 26 Here this definition is
expanded to cover nation-states. In so doing, it is assumed that states seek
to use rational means to achieve their desired ends; they are rational, selfinterested, more-or-less unitary actors with motivations similar to those of
the individuals in Olson's groups.' 7 Olson describes three types of groups:?
(1) "privileged" groups in which each member is willing to pay for
provision of the collective good; (2) "intermediate" small groups in which

21. Id. at 50.
22. WALTZ, supra note 12, at 196.
23. ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 199 (1989).
24. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 9-10.
25. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DIscORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 8 (1984).
26. OLSON, supra note 9, at 8.
27. States are not, in fact, unitary actors, but assuming that they are works well in getting
the big picture.
28. OLSON, supra note 9, at 49-51.
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no one member has an interest in bearing the costs of providing the good,
but in which there is some possibility for cooperation because the members
are unable to recognize those who are "free riding"; and (3) "latent" large
groups in which the collective good will not be provided unless one
member is willing to absorb the costs of doing so, short of selective
incentives. Olson describes a large group that has been energized by
selective incentives as a "mobilized" latent group.29
Some small groups can undertake collective action without coercion
or positive incentives. If one member (or subgroup of members) of the
group gets a large enough portion of the benefits of providing the public
good to make paying for all or most of it worthwhile, he or she will be
willing to pay much (or all) of the costs of action.' Importantly, however,
the benefit going to the member(s) paying for the good must exceed the cost
being paid by the member(s) willing to bear the costs. But, as Olson
suggests, the provision of the collective good by these small groups will not
be optimal, despite the fact that optimal provision would be in the interests
of all members of the group.3 Sub-optimal provision of the good results
because those members who do not pay for the collective good still benefit
from it. This phenomenon becomes more important as the group gets larger.
Three factors conspire to prevent large groups from undertaking
collective action that would further the interests of the group.32 First, the
larger the group, the less benefit each member receives and the further the
group is from providing an optimal supply of the collective good.33 Second,
because of the small benefit each member of a large group receives, there
is little likelihood that any one member (or a few members) will pay the cost
of providing even some of the good.' Finally, larger groups are more
expensive to start and operate, thereby creating an economic obstacle to
collective action.35 The upshot is that "[i]n a large, latent group there will be
no tendency for the group to organize to achieve its goals through the
voluntary, rational action of the members of the group, even if there is
perfect consensus."' Thus, according to Olson, in the absence of coercion
or incentives beyond or outside the good being sought, large groups will
not provide a collective good.37

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 48.
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Olson states that the typical participant in a large group will be
unwilling to devote energies sufficient to optimally further the group's
goals because each participant's contribution will be relatively small and the
resulting benefit to that individual will be exceeded by the cost of his
efforts. 8 It is for this reason, "among others, that organizations so often turn
to the small group; committees, sub-committees, and small leadership
groups are created, and once created they tend to play a crucial role."39 As
Olson points out, "'action taking' groups and subgroups tended to be much
smaller than'non-action taking' groups and subgroups.... [S]maller groups
could act more decisively and use their resources more effectively than
large groups...."' Committees and working groups should be small to be
effective.
According to Olson, in order for the individuals in a large group to
undertake the costs of collective action, there must be some sort of sanction
or incentive distinct from the good being sought: "Only a separate and
'selective' incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act
in a group-oriented way."4 As Keohane points out, the success of some
large groups can be explained by their having provided private goods as a
by-product of membership.42 The incentive - either positive or
negative -must work selectively on individuals in the group, not on the
group as a whole.43 Groups can use negative inducements against those
individuals not joining in action and give positive inducements or rewards
to those who do. A variety of incentives are possible to foster group
participation and cooperation." Perhaps the most common category of
incentives would be one that brings economic benefit - or difficulty - to the
recipient. Other moral, psychological, or social incentives could also prove
useful in garnering support for collective action. For instance, the prestige,
respect, and friendship associated with group membership may help induce
an individual to participate. Likewise, ostracism from the circle of
individuals comprising the group may help push a non-participant to join
the group and contribute toward achievement of the collective good.
Olson suggests that social incentives will only work in small groups
or large "federal" groups (federations of smaller groups). Olson qualifies
this point by suggesting that mass media propaganda may be a social
incentive capable of mobilizing large groups:

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 51.
KEOHANE, supra note 25, at 77.
Id.
See OLSON, supra note 9, at 60-65.
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If the members of a latent group are somehow continuously
bombarded with propaganda about the worthiness of the
attempt to satisfy the common interest in question, they may
perhaps in time develop social pressures not entirely unlike
those that can be generated in a face-to-face group, and these
social pressures may help the latent group to obtain the
collective good.45
As the story of the Montreal Protocol suggests (see below), the media can
be an important stimulant for collective action. 46
Information is also important to cooperation. According to Hardin,
"the degree of cooperation may depend on the quality of knowledge
generally available." 47 Keohane argues that collective action is especially
difficult when "uncertainty is great and actors have different access to
information.... "48 Information proved to be a critical factor in the creation
of the Med Plan cleanup and ozone-protection regimes. Information is
proving to be even more critical for climate change.
Arild Underdal has suggested a "law of least ambitious program,"
which summarizes much of Olson's logic:
where international management can be established only
through agreement among all significant parties involved,
and where such a regulation is considered only on its own
merits, collective action will be limited to those measures
acceptable to the least enthusiastic party, [but that party may
join if there are adequate] arguments, side-payments, or
various kinds of political pressure. 9
The consequence is that parties will hold back, even if they have strong
interests in acting collectively. They have to be pushed rather hard to join
in if the costs of doing so are more than modest.
PROTECTING THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Among successful international environmental agreements are the
Montreal Protocol and, albeit less so, the Mediterranean Action Plan. The
former is effective because collective action has been sufficiently robust for
scientists to predict that ozone depletion will be reversed and reduced, with

45.

Id. at 63 n.18.

46. MOSTAFA K. TOLBA & IWONA RuMMEL-BULSKA, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY:
NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS FOR THE WORLD, 1973-1992, at 66 (1998).
47. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 182.
48. KEOHANE, supra note 25, at 12.

49.

Quoted in Peter H. Sand, InternationalCooperation:The Environmental Experience, in

PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 241 (Jessica Tuchman Mathews ed., 1991).
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the stratospheric ozone layer expected to recover over the next 50 years or
so. ° The latter has been modestly effective because it has resulted in a set
of cooperative arrangements, monitoring, and regulation over a large and
extraordinarily disparate group of states, thereby limiting the impact of
myriad pollution sources on the Mediterranean Sea. Both the Med Plan and
the Montreal Protocol contain requisites for collective action discussed by
Olson, especially selective incentives or side-payments. These international
agreements can tell us a great deal about the efficacy of CAT in the
environmental context and how Olson's theory relates to the climate regime.
Pollution of the Mediterranean was perceived to be a collective
goods problem because pollutants from states bordering the sea were
thought to be washing up on other states' beaches.5' This perception
contributed ultimately to the creation of the Med Plan, a regime that is "a
collectively negotiated, ongoing set of arrangements for the progressive
control of Mediterranean marine pollution." 2 Negotiated and agreed to in
the mid-1970s, the Med Plan is the product of the Barcelona Convention for
the Protection of the Mediterranean against Pollution. 3 The plan brought
together littoral states and the then European Community to protect the
sea's environment and, later, to promote environmentally sustainable
development in the Mediterranean region.'6 The plan now comprises a host
of cooperative arrangements among about two dozen governments and the
European Union, working with the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP) and nongovernmental actors, in a "coordinating unit" (secretariat)
and regional activity centers.5 5
Not all analysts have described the Med Plan as successful given its
apparently modest impacts on polluting behaviors.5 6 However, according
to Peter Haas, who pioneered research on it, the Med Plan has been
moderately successful because it induced member governments to take new policies that enhanced environmental
quality in the region, and that those governments would not

50. Patrick L. Barry & Tony Phillips, Earth's Ozone Layer Appears to Be on the Road to
Recovery, SCIENCE@NASA, May 26,2006, http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2006/26may
_ozone.htm.
51. Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communitiesand MediterraneanPollution
Control, 43 INT'L ORG. 377,378 (1989) [hereinafter Haas, Do Regimes Matter?];HAAS, supranote
19, at 70.
52. Haas, Do Regimes Matter?,supra note 51, at 381.
53. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (1976) and
Protocols (1980, 1982), entered into force Feb. 12, 1978, available at http://eelink.net/
-asilwildlife/barcelona.html.
54. See United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Mediterranean Action Plan,
http://www.unepmap.org/html/homeeng.asp.
55. Id.
56. MILES ET AL., supra note 10, at 311-12.
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have adopted in the absence of the Med Plan. While the
environmental data is choppy and not very good, it does
appear to be the case... that the Med is certainly no worse in
quality than it was before the Med Plan, and that the level of
coastal population and economic activity has doubled or
tripled in the intervening years. Not to mention the
unintentional and unanticipated effects of establishing a
political model for multilateral cooperation. 7
Thus, the Med Plan has done what the climate regime is supposed to have
done: stabilize pollution despite economic growth.
Several factors contributed to collective action that addresses
Mediterranean pollution. Contrary to some other scholars, Haas declares
that "coercion, public opinion, and anticipation of benefits do not fully
explain the extent of compliance," although these were important
contributing factors.- 8 He suggests that the most significant factor leading
to collective action and the Med Plan was the existence of "epistemic
communities," which he describes as "ecologists and marine scientists who
set the international agenda and directed their own states toward support
of international efforts and toward the introduction of strong pollution
control measures at home."5 9 According to Haas, the success of epistemic
communities in this instance can be largely attributed to their ability to
increase "governmental learning," a process whereby scientists and
ecologists informed domestic and foreign policy makers about the extent of
the problem so as to elicit their interest in protecting the Mediterranean. 6°
The process Haas outlines is complex, but it is based on a professional
campaign to spread information, and on the power that is frequently
associated with information. As Olson suggested, information eases the
move to collective action.6'
An important additional factor contributing to the success of the
Med Plan negotiations included the involvement of an international
organization, namely UNEP. UNEP provided information and resources
from its Regional Seas Program. UNEP also served as a coordinator,
enabling scientists and diplomats to pool their efforts toward the goal of a
cleaner Mediterranean. Through its efforts, UNEP helped the littoral states
reduce transaction costs and assisted them in opening additional diplomatic
channels, thereby easing the move toward collective action.62 This function
is analogous to Olson's small leadership forums.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

E-mail from Peter Haas to the author (Dec. 20, 2004; 9:35 PM) (on file with author).
Haas, Do Regimes Matter?, supra note 51, at 401.
Id. at 384.
Id.
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 25 (1982).
HAAS, supra note 19, at 184.
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Haas's account of the Med Plan further demonstrates the salience
of Olson's basic CAT. Selective incentives were used to promote
cooperation. 63 Monitoring and research provisions of the Med Plan gave
symbolic recognition to Mediterranean states' scientific stature. Research
funds, technology, and scientific equipment were transferred from the
developed to the developing participants in the plan. UNEP spread
pollution-control construction contracts around the Mediterranean and
hired consultants and distributed offices in such a way that the states most
resistant to joining the plan benefited from it."
Haas believes that epistemic communities and UNEP were
sufficiently able to influence states for them to "recalculate their interests in
light of new information, or as they are penetrated by new groups. Thus,
following such involvement, governments were able to overcome the
domination of stronger states, and smaller states recognized the need to
protect the Mediterranean."' The important components of the Med Plan's
modest success - epistemic communities and UNEP-helped form a
consensus and provided crucial information. These factors then led to the
creation of a regime that had a variety of incentives as part of its structure.
Thus, the Med Plan shows the utility of key components of CAT in the
context of international environmental cooperation. However, the Med Plan
has its own weaknesses. For example, its attempt to control so many
pollutants over such a wide area with too few resources, and the involvement of so many actors makes coordination among them difficult.' This is
a warning to those who are negotiating the climate regime that must follow
the Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2008-2012).
PREVENTING STRATOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION
The stratospheric ozone is a layer of gas surrounding the earth that
filters dangerous ultraviolet radiation from the sun.67 Several chemicals
emitted into the atmosphere - chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozonedepleting chemicals (ODCs) -deplete this layer.' Among the adverse
effects of this depletion are increased levels of skin cancer and eye cataracts,
crop damage, and harm to the marine food chain, including fisheries.69

63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 189.
66. See MILES ET AL., supranote 10, at 326-27.
67. STEPHEN ISON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND POLICIES 143 (2002).
68. Id.
69. UNEP, EnvironmentalEffects of Ozone Depletionand Its Intenctionswith ClimateChange: 2002
Assessment, http://www.unep.org/ozone/pdf/eeap-report2002.pdf#search=%22Environmental
%20Effects%20f%200zone%2ODepetin%2and%20itsyo2Olnteractions%20with%200inmate%2
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According to Richard Benedick (then chief U.S. diplomat in the ozone
negotiations), the Montreal Protocol addresses "an unprecedented global
ecological threat, one that required governments to balance distant but
possibly catastrophic dangers against the very real short-run economic
dislocations that would be caused by preventive measures." 70 These
factors - potentially catastrophic dangers and economic dislocations - are
also applicable to the climate regime.
Benedick defined the dilemma of protecting the common good of
stratospheric ozone: "The very nature of ozone depletion meant that no
single country or group of countries, however powerful, could effectively
solve the problem. Without far-ranging cooperation, the efforts of some
nations to protect the ozone layer would be vitiated. " n The obstacles facing
those wanting to develop an international regime to address ozone
depletion were immense. Industrial interests, scientific uncertainties, and
technological hurdles were standing in the way of collective action.
Nevertheless, an agreement to act collectively was reached and ultimately
strengthened at subsequent meetings of parties to the protocol.
Benedick attributed the success of the Montreal Protocol to several
factors.72 Like Haas, he gives much credit to scientists (Haas's epistemic
communities) who were active in working groups set up to determine
provisions of the treaty. According to Benedick's account, "Close
collaboration between scientists and key government officials who became
convinced of the long-term dangers ultimately prevailed over more
parochial and short-run interests of national politicians."' It was partly due
to the influence of scientists that political leaders took action on ozone
despite there still being considerable uncertainty about the full nature of the
problem. Scientists, along with environmental nongovernmental
organizations, also played a role in educating the public, thereby mobilizing
public opinion and prompting media attention. Additionally, leadership of
the U.S. government and (as with the Med Plan) UNEP (and its head,
Mustafa Tolba) were "critical in mobilizing an international consensus."74
U.S. leadership was evident in its preemptive action to limit emissions of
ODCs.h This action created an environment in which industry had an

0Change%3A%202002%20Assmssent%22
70. RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMAcY: NEW DIRECTIONS INSAFEGUARDING THE
PLANET xiii (1991).
71. Richard E. Benedick, Protecting the Ozone Layer: New Directions in Diplomacy, in
PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 49, at 143.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 144.
74. Id. at 145.

75.

Id.
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economic incentive to find a technological solution to the problem (namely,
substitutes for ODCs, which U.S. industry was first to develop).76
Side-payments, another very important factor contributing to
collective action on ozone, were offered to poorer countries that might not
otherwise accede to the agreement. The protocol calls for developed
countries to "facilitate access" to financial assistance and the technologies
necessary to produce substitutes for ODCs. 77 Among other incentives
geared toward convincing states to join the protocol, the European
Community was allowed to aggregate its consumption limits to the benefit
of individual members, the Soviet Union was allowed to use CFC plants
already under construction, small-scale producers of ODCs were permitted
to transfer production increases among themselves, and developing
countries were allowed to continue producing CFCs for a substantial
additional period of time. 78In addition to such positive incentives, the treaty
called for the gradual prohibition of purchases of ODCs and products
produced with or containing them.79 Such prohibitions imposed sanctions
on states outside the protocol that might exploit the end to production of
ODCs by parties to it.' Furthermore, a multilateral ozone fund, paid for by
wealthy governments, was created to assist developing-country parties in
switching to ODC alternatives.81
The ozone regime demonstrates the importance of Olson's small
working groups and committees. As Benedick repeatedly argues, it was the
work of such groups that provided the basis for so much of the success at
Montreal.82 He points out that the "complicated ozone protection issue was
separated into manageable components, and informal collaborative
efforts - workshops, conferences, consultations - laid the foundation for the
eventual international consensus."' Importantly, the Montreal ozone
agreement was purposely made flexible in order to reflect future changes
in the scientific knowledge or the political consensus; the agreement, "far
from being a static solution,...constitutes an ongoing process."' Indeed, in
subsequent meetings of the parties, restrictions on ODCs were increased, as
were specific financial incentives and trade disincentives to bring new
members into the effort.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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Id. at 146.
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Sand, supra note 49, at 242.
Benedick, supra note 71, at 127.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 148.
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The Montreal Protocol fulfills many of Olson's criteria for collective
action. Incentives, disincentives, information, leadership, small groups, and
iterated diplomatic engagement all played their parts in fostering
cooperation and, indeed, extending and deepening it as the problem
became better understood. There are lessons here for the climate regime,
although ozone depletion is a vastly simpler problem to address than is
global warming.
PROTECTING THE CLIMATE SYSTEM
Most (or possibly all) countries will be affected by climate change,
most (and probably all) of them in adverse ways.' Consequently, most of
them have an interest in collective action that will limit the emissions of
GHGs polluting the Earth's atmosphere, and concerted action is required
to address it. It was clear to diplomats as they entered negotiations for the
FCCC in the late 1980s and early 1990s that dealing effectively with climate
change would require the creation of an international regime in which most
of the world's governments would agree to act collectively to reduce the
emissions of GHGs. However, the number of countries causing the problem
is quite large and growing, and the costs of doing something significant
about it are high (at least to many economic sub-sectors). Many
governments were not convinced that it would be in their immediate
interests to pay those costs, and many still retain this view.86 As George
Rathjens suggested a decade and a half ago, "even putting aside the
complicating fact of great uncertainty, getting agreement on some instrumentality to insure that everyone - or at least a significant number - makes
an appropriate contribution to a group effort to achieve the benefits of a
well-maintained commons will be more difficult than in the usual case" of
commons problem.87 How right Rathjens was.
To achieve an effective climate regime it is necessary to address the
constraints placed on collective action outlined by Olson. The Med Plan and
the Montreal Protocol suggest that collective action on climate change is
possible if these constraints can be overcome. Agreement depends on
achieving some consensus regarding the nature and magnitude of global
warming and resulting climatic changes, the best ways to mitigate them and
cut pollution causing them, and how best to pay for those actions. It has
been fairly clear from the beginning that if one large country or group of

85. See IPCC, supra note 1; ROBERT T.WATSON ET AL., THE REGIONAL IMPACrS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE (1998).
86. See IAN ROWLANDS, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ATMOSPHERIc CHANGE 133-42 (1995).

87.

George W. Rathjens, Energy and Climate Change, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENT, supra note 49, at 173.
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states were willing to assume much of the costs of collective action, or if
sufficient incentives could be offered to participants, then international
cooperation on climate change could take place. Unfortunately, climate
change has so far fit perniciously into Olson's "indeterminate" category,
whereby no single international actor has perceived a sufficiently large
benefit from the collective good to justify paying most of the costs of
providing it, but in which its contribution to the problem is so large that its
failure to participate is central to effective action.' s The Europeans seem
willing to take on this burden,89 but actualizing that willingness is not yet
significant from the perspective of affecting global GHGs, and at times it
seems tenuous. That is, collective action on climate change remains
problematic - at best.
Scientists agree that GHGs are responsible for warming the planet
more than would occur without such pollutants, and they agreed long ago
that concentrations of these gases were increasing at "unprecedentedly
rapid rates."9" There are very few exceptions to this accepted wisdom, but
where "climate skepticism" does exist, mostly in the United States, its
impact on policy has been disproportionately great, although this seems to
be slowly changing as news reports of changing climate and its impacts
become more common. 91 However, fairly significant uncertainty and some
disagreement remain on the specific impacts of climate change. Thus, Thomas
Schelling was right to conclude even before the FCCC was negotiated that
"[u]ncertainties are huge, and most of them will persist."92 Despite the
scientific consensus, there is not, even now, a political consensus among the
world's governments on the threat posed by climate change. Most of them
agree with the FCCC's general notion that there is a problem that must be
dealt with, but this still runs up against the difficulties of actually allocating
the responsibilities and costs of doing something about it. Political actors
have pushed sufficiently hard to thwart the development of a consensus in
the United States and a few other developed countries (e.g., Australia), as
well as in some major developing countries, because they do not yet see the
adverse consequences as being great enough to justify what they perceive

88. See OLSON, supra note 9, at 44.
89. Paul G. Harris, Europe and Environmental Change: Sharing the Burdens of Global
Warming, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 309-55 (2006).
90. WORLD RESOURCES INST., WORLD RESOURCES 1990-91, at 12 (1990). See IPCC, supra
note 1.
91. JOHANSEN, supra note 7, at 117-45.
92. T.C. Schelling, Economic Responses to Global Warming: Prospects for Cooperative
Approaches, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMICPOLICY RESPONSES 197,199 (Rudiger Dornbusch
& James M. Poterba eds., 1991).
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to be the short-term costs of taking action.9 As in the case of ozone
depletion, there is disagreement, but in this case it is much more important
because the costs for some groups of people, influential industries, and
economic sectors, if not for whole countries, of meeting the provisions of an
effective climate regime are vastly greater than the costs of the ozone
protection regime. 9 Unwillingness to act is dissipating, but much too slowly
to prevent what seems to be an already "dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system" 95 (to parrot the FCCC).
The costs of preventing climate change are immediate, but the
benefits will not be seen for many decades. However, the cost-benefit ratio
must be viewed as favorable before actors will join in strong collective
action.9' This suggests that most governments will not be willing to make
the major sacrifices necessary to effect a halt to (let alone reverse) global
warming.97 As classical CAT points out, for large groups, if the costs of
action are high, collective action is not likely; the larger the contribution that
each member of the group must provide to achieve the collective good, the
less likelihood there is for collective action. 98 This is not rocket science, but
it is a basic idea that is sometimes ignored by those who, quite justifiably,
vociferously demand aggressive collective international action on climate
change.
Classical CAT tells us that groups having access to selective
incentives will be more likely to act collectively than will those not having
such incentives,9" thus explaining, at least in part, the relative successes of
the Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol. It will be inordinately difficult to
achieve more effective international cooperation on climate change without
similar provisions for coercion (negative inducements) and side payments
(positive inducements). Selective incentives commonly used in environmental treaty bargaining are access to funding, resources, markets, and
technology." ° The developing countries have made it clear that they want
to be "paid" for their participation in a climate regime."m° The requested

93. See, e.g., CLIVE HAMILTON, RUNNING FROM THE STORM: THE DEVELOPMENTOF CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY IN AUSTRALIA 53-86 (2001).
94. Costs across an economy may not be excessive and might even result in savings, but
costs to certain economic sectors (e.g., fossil fuel energy producers and those parts of the
economy dependent on these fuels) are likely to be huge. These sectors have resisted accepting
the consensus on climate change.
95. UNFCCC, supranote 5, art. 2, at 4.
96. OLSON, supranote 61, at 29.
97. Cf. Rathjens, supra note 87, at 179.
98. OLSON, supranote 61, at 28.
99. Id. at 34.
100. Sand, supranote 49, at 241.
101. Paul G. Harris, Fairness,Responsibility, and Climate Change, 17 ETHICS & INTL AFFAIRS
152 (2003).
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payments include access to experts and technology, training of indigenous
scientists and technicians, and grants to aid development in general and
adherence to the regime in particular."° Effective action to prevent global
warming will arguably "require resource transfers.. .greater than all of the
foreign aid, multilateral and bilateral aid in current programs. " 1°3 Positive
inducements include the transfer of technology and financial aid from the
developed world to the developing world, as was done in the Med Plan and
as has been incorporated into provisions for implementing the Kyoto
Protocol."°4 But the latter efforts have been feeble so far, failing to provide
positive inducements to strong action.'05 Incentives will have to be
strengthened mightily and given vastly more financial backing. Coercion
might come in the form of trade penalties similar to those found in the
Montreal Protocol.
The economic resources to provide financial aid (bribes) to
developing countries might come from a carbon tax imposed on those
members of the regime that are producing the most GHGs per capita.
Carbon taxes were proposed in the early 1990s as one of the selective
incentives that might be useful in any climate regime." 6 Such taxes would
provide an incentive, albeit negative, for improved efficiency and could
provide financial resources to assist the poorer participants in the regime.
However, as Schelling predicted at the time, it was never likely that an
international carbon tax would be implemented. 7 He pointed out that such
a tax would cost the United States alone well in excess of $125 billion,"'0 and
he "utterly dismiss[ed] the possibility that the United States would
contribute in any fashion.. .upwards of $100 billion per year, or that the
Senate would ratify any treaty incurring such financial commitments."' °9
For the United States, despite being the world's most profligate global
polluter, the notion of an international carbon tax is a complete non-starter.
The lack of a tax means that there is no strong negative inducement for the
greatest developed-country polluters to cut GHG emissions. What is more,

102. Durwood Zaelke & James Cameron, GlobalWarming andClimate Change- An Overview
of the InternationalLegal Process, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 283 (1990).
103. Schelling, supra note 92, at 219.
104. PAMELA S. CHASEK ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 223-30 (4th ed. 2006);
SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN E. OnT, THE KYOTO PROTOcOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE

POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 232-33 (1999).
105. OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 104.
106. Id. at 44.
107. Schelling, supra note 92, at 208.
108. Id. at 215.
109. Id. Indeed, in 1997, the United States passed a resolution declaring its opposition to
any climate treaty that would harm the U.S. economy. Paul G. Harris, Common but
Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
27, 37 (1999).
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without some kind of global source of money that a universal carbon tax
could provide, the international funds that have been created to induce
countries to take the climate regime seriously-some financing from the
Global Environment Facility, along with the Special Climate Change Fund,
the Least Developed Country Fund, and the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation
Fund -arguably will never have enough resources to persuade major
developing countries to join collective action on climate change."' Indeed,
the growing use of funds to help them adaptto climate change may have the
perverse effect of giving them some incentive to avoid limiting GHG
pollution.
Alternative strategies much less anathema to the U.S. government,
such as emissions trading, have so far achieved very little in the way of
GHG emissions reductions."' Government-mandated trading of carbon
dioxide emissions began in the European Union in January 2005,12 and
informal trading has been going on for some time in London and Chicago.
These efforts hold promise for reducing GHG emissions, but the emissions
limits underlying them will have to be profoundly increased if there is to be
significant movement toward meeting the FCCC's objective of stabilizing
emissions and preventing even more upset to the Earth's climate system
than is already guaranteed by past emissions. This profound increase in
GHG emissions limitations is not foreseen at present. Successful collective
action is unlikely in the near future, especially if the United States remains
unwilling to enthusiastically participate.
Even coercion is unlikely to be effective in promoting collective
action toward a truly effective climate regime. Early in the climate
negotiations, Rathjens suggested that some economically weaker countries
would be susceptible to coercion by economic means,"' but this is unlikely
to be the case for many other states, such as China or India, which must join
in collective action against climate change if such action is to be a long-term
success. (China's emissions are shooting up as it develops and adopts a
U.S.-style transport infrastructure. It is expected to overtake the United
States very soon to become the largest source of GHG pollution."')

110. See Suraje Dessai & Emma Lisa Schipper, The Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol:
Analysis and Future Prospects, 13 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 149, 150 (2003).
111. See JOHN M. REILLY & SERGEY PALTSEV, MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCI. & POLICY OF
GLOBAL CHANGE, REP. No. 127, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN EMISSION TRADING SCHEME

(Oct. 2005), available at web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC-Rpt127.pdf.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Rathjens, supra note 87, at 176.
114. See Paul G. Harris & Hongyuan Yu, Environmental Changeand the Asia Pacific: China
Responds to Global Warming, 17 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 45-58 (2005); Paul G.
Harris & Chihiro Udagawa, Defusing the Bombshell? Agenda 21 and Economic Development in
China, 11 REv. INT'L POL. ECON. 618, 620 (2004).
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Sanctions or coercion would probably also require U.S. participation, but it
is unlikely that the United States will show much enthusiasm in this regard.
Nor are the Europeans likely to want to take this route because it is not fair
to the world's poor. This again begs the question of where the positive
inducements - strong ones not evidenced so far - will come from.
From the start of negotiations on the climate regime, the framework
Vienna Convention on ozone protection and the resulting Montreal Protocol
were seen as models for collective action."" The United Nations and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change therefore supported a
framework convention and subsequent protocols based on those
agreements. 116 The result was the FCCC and the follow-on Kyoto Protocol.
But informed skeptics never shared the view that Montreal was a good
model. To wit:
The Montreal Protocol.. .is no harbinger for suppression of
CO2. Economically, what is at stake is two or three orders of
magnitude greater for fossil fuels than for CFCs, and the
prospects for technological replacement of CFCs are much
brighter. (The ozone protocol does illustrate the need for
worldwide collaboration to make restrictions worthwhile....)
But in one respect it may be revealing. Developing countries
successfully insisted on more than $200 million of help from
several developed-nation contributors." 7
An article in the June 16, 1990 edition of The Economist described the
Montreal protocol as "the nearest thing to a dry-run for a climate-change
convention" and acknowledged that the ozone regime "was made possible
by special circumstances which may not be there with climate change."18
Indeed, climate change differs from ozone depletion for several
reasons."19 CFCs were produced by a small number of industries and have
limited uses. Fossil fuels are produced everywhere and are used by
everyone in modernized societies. The costs of preventing climate change
are much higher than those for saving the stratospheric ozone, and these
costs are not evenly distributed. And many important states (e.g., Australia,
the United States, China, and most of the oil-exporting states) are still not
enthusiastic about undertaking collective action to prevent climate change.

115. OBERTHUR & OTr, supra note 104, at 282; see also CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER ET AL.,
EUROPEAN CLIMATE PLATFORM, THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: TAKING STOCK AND
LOOKING AHEAD (July 2006), availableat http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?itemid=1360
("download pdf").
116. OBERTHUR & OTr, supranote 104, at 282.
117. Schelling, supra note 92, at 217-18.
118. A Cool Lookat HotAir: The Environment Isthe New Stuff of Diplomacy (Green Diplomacy),
THE ECONOMIST (US), June 16,1990, at 17.
119. Id.
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As The Economist put it way back in 1990, "Some countries will prefer to be
free-riders rather than sign."120 This remains nearly as true now as it was
then. To be sure, resistance to action is weakening, but the pace of this
weakening is glacial, and it has not been supplanted by enthusiasm among
governments for major action. The conference of the FCCC parties in
December 2005 had trouble even agreeing on whether to have talks on
future emissions restrictions (although U.S. attempts to prevent them were
thwarted in the end), let alone moving toward implementing significant
GHG cuts.' Indeed, as Scott Barrett argues, the Kyoto Protocol is,
inevitably, a failed treaty because it does not overcome the incentives of
states to free ride,"' much as classical CAT would anticipate might happen
under the circumstances.
Haas believes that the process of "interest recalculation" brought
on by epistemic communities in the Med Plan case would be generally
applicable to collective action on other international environmental
problems." His assessment indicates that epistemic communities were
important not only to the Med Plan, but also to the Montreal protocol and
24
the European Community's collective policies for control of acid rain.
However, Haas declared 15 years ago that "the distribution of costs and
benefits from possible global climate change is sufficiently well estimated
so as to inhibit the US government from delegating authority to ecologically
inclined atmospheric scientists. " " This succinctly describes the approach
of the Bush administration and its industry allies even today. More
generally, scientists have had more difficulty influencing climate change
policy than other environmental cases due to the very high anticipated costs
associated with action on climate change and the relatively high degree of
scientific and economic uncertainty. 26 They have promoted action, but with
an effect that has been far too limited. This shows again how CAT is
applicable in the case of climate change, but in a pessimistic sense. That is,
CAT applies to climate change (as it did to the Mediterranean and ozone
agreements), but in this case collective action will be harder to achieve. The

120.

Id.

121. For a summary of the talks, see Summary of the Eleventh Conference of the Partiesto the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and First Conference of the Parties Serving as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 28 November-10 December 2005, 12 EARTH
NEGoTIATIONS BULL., Dec, 12, 2005, availableat http://www.iisd.ca/vo112/.
122. ScoTr BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT ch. 15 (2003). See also MICHAEL FINuS,
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123. See Haas, Do Regimes Matter?,supra note 51, at 402.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 403.
126. See generally Neil E. Harrison, Political Responses to Changing Uncertainty in Climate
Science, in SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 109 (Neil E. Harrison
& Gary C. Bryner eds., 2004).
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behavior Olson describes for large groups lacking incentives, or when no
single member is willing to pay most of the costs, describes the
circumstances surrounding international efforts to respond to climate
change. From this perspective, international collective action to substantially
address climate change remains unlikely.
Keohane has argued that, "if there is neither a hegemonic leader
nor an international regime, prospects for cooperation are bleak indeed, and
dilemmas of collective action are likely to be severe."127 In the case of
climate change, it is likely that a more effective regime and a (benign)
hegemonic leader are required. The regime cannot be very successful
without the participation - some argue leadership - of the United States.
The United States is important because it produces a quarter of the
pollutants causing global warming-more GHGs than any other
country"2 -and it is potentially the most effective supplier of incentives
useful in garnering support for collective action. But, as suggested above,
robust U.S. participation is not likely for some years. There is some
grassroots action there, and some U.S. states are mandating GHG emissions
limitations, but the pace and scale of action is infinitesimal compared to
what is required to slow global warming. Indeed, the current U.S.
government is doing all it can to prevent other countries from working
together to limit global warming. 29 It has put off action to become more
energy efficient and less reliant on fossil fuels, making reducing GHG
emissions more costly as time passes - and hence creating greater resistance
to action within the United States. The longer the United States puts off
action, the more it will have to pay to implement a truly effective climate
regime -and the more intense will be resistance from some economic
sectors to undertaking the increasingly costly action required. From the
beginning, the United States has viewed the costs of a "serious attempt" to
cut GHGs as exceeding the potential benefits, 130notwithstanding the efforts
of the Clinton administration to start acting on the country's GHG
emissions. Though climate change is likely to affect the United States in
harmful ways (it may be doing so already, as suggested by Hurricane

127. KEoRANE, supranote 25, z' 240.
128. Gregg Marland, Tom Boden & Robert Andres, Global, Regional, and National CO2
Emissions (2005), availableat http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em.cont.htm.
129. Notwithstanding U.S. leadership in creating the so-called Asia-Pacific Partnership
on Clean Development and Climate, which arguably is an attempt to undermine the Kyoto
Protocol and the climate regime rather than an effort to strengthen international efforts to
address climate change. See generally Remarks of Energy Secretary Bodman, U.S. Department
of Energy, Asia-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement Gan. 12,2006), http://www.energy.
gov/news/2964.htm.
130. A Cool Look at Hot Air, supra note 118.
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Katrina in 2005131), most Americans will be able to adapt-unlike most
people in the poorest parts of the world. 32
As Thomas Schelling put it well before the Kyoto Protocol was
negotiated,
in searching out the national interests around the globe that
may motivate countries to participate in cooperative
approaches to global warming, I conclude that most of the
countries that can afford to do anything may perceive very
little interest of their own, and most of the countries that
perceive themselves potentially vulnerable have urgent needs
that leave no resources to invest in greenhouse abatement.'33
This attitude is shifting in Europe, where they are witnessing genuine
efforts to implement some GHG emissions cuts and emissions trading.' 3
But words surpass deeds, even as Europe and the United States move
further apart on this issue. And there should be no expectation of more than
token contributions to the climate regime from the developing world.
Indeed, they still very much view action on climate change as a question of
justice. 35 They point out that the wealthy countries of the world have
caused most of the problem, and that those countries ought to act robustly
before even asking the poor ones to begin limiting their own emissions of
GHGs) 36
Schelling outlined ten reasons why the problem of climate change
would be (and remains) "daunting" :131 (1) it is a global problem that no
single country can solve, even if that single country were willing to do so;
(2) the magnitude of potential abatement costs are perceived as being
"immense"; (3) there is a disparity between the equitable distribution of
costs and the optimal distribution of abatement; (4) the climate regime must
be flexible yet able to survive at least 50 years (an understatement); (5) all
countries consume fossil fuels, thus all must participate in the regime (an
overstatement given that some contribute very little to the problem); (6) the
distribution of energy sources and use differs drastically among countries;
(7) states have varying abilities to pay for carbon emissions abatement and
to adjust practices to achieve that abatement; (8) the rate at which
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population and fuel use increases differs among states, and their rates of
economic expansion vary; (9) nuclear power -the main alternative source
of electricity-is expensive and unpopular in many countries (but this
seems to be changing incrementally as the urgency of acting to address
climate change grows and the nuclear-power industry steps up lobbying);
(10) significant uncertainties remain - and will persist for some time. Zaelke
and Cameron add that "[a]nother hurdle is the difficulty of defining and
determining concepts of liability, responsibility, and illegality for ensuring
adequate compensation for the measurable harmful impacts of global
warming."" 3 Daunting indeed!
Despite the successes of the Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol,
all of these potential obstacles suggest that the climate change problem will
continue to be a much more difficult collective action problem, similar to the
scenarios of unsuccessful collective action envisioned by Olson's theory.
CAT tells us that, unless the disadvantages of large groups are overcome,
"valuable institutions that would benefit a set of individuals will not
necessarily be created." 139 As George Rathjens points out pessimistically,
Because of the uncertainty, the very long lag-times involved,
and the fact that effective mitigative action is likely to require
something approaching a global consensus, the prospects for
near-term action directed at reducing global warming must be
seen to be poor. These factors.. .tend to make mitigation a less
likely response to the "threat" than delay and eventual
adaptation. Public policy would be well advised to face this
reality. 14°
This is precisely what has happened. Increasingly, international diplomacy
regarding climate change, and practical responses to it, are about adaptation,
not about limiting global warming. 14 1 Considering the circumstances
surrounding the climate change problem, as Oran Young told us in the
1980s, "it is no cause for surprise that the foundations for an international
regime designed to protect the ozone layer are now in place, whereas a
regime to deal with global climate change is not yet in sight." 4 2 There is
now a regime, comprised of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, but there is
not yet an effective one.
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Such pessimism does not exclude the possibility that some
significant reductions in GHGs will be possible, but it suggests that such
reductions will often be a result of actions undertaken because they are
justifiable on cost-benefit grounds in their own right (e.g., reduced
emissions due to energy conservation prompted by a desire to improve
local air quality, to use less petroleum as its price increases, or to improve
energy security). 43 To be sure, the only effective method to limit climate
change is to reduce GHG emissions associated with energy use. Given the
increasing desire to improve energy efficiency and to improve the local
environment, the prospects of favorable changes are very good. Indeed, the
Europeans are taking substantial action in this regard. Alas, that action is
very far short of what is required to address and limit global warming and
to avert dangerous climatic change.
CONCLUSION
The climate regime has not been a total failure - an optimist would
say that it is a work in progress that may one day have a significant positive
impact on climate change - but it would be disingenuous to say it has been
even slightly successful so far. Governments have come nowhere near
meeting the goal set in 1992, with the signing of the FCCC, of returning
GHG emissions to 1990 levels (by 2000) and stabilizing greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere, let alone achieving the cuts in emissions
of GHGs called for in the Kyoto Protocol, which themselves are grossly
inadequate compared to what scientists say is necessary. There is no
prospect whatever of this substantially changing before the end of the
Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012). It seems likely that the collective
action necessary to protect the Earth from climate change is not very likely
in the medium term, either. More agreements and promises by
governments to act are likely, and increasing action at local levels may be
about to take off, but those countries that enact major new commitments
will be few (if any). As Schelling put it a decade and a half ago, "Prospects
for serious abatement [of GHG emissions] in the near future are not
good."144 Prospects have not changed since. There will most likely be some
action so that the problem will not be as bad as it would be if nothing were
done, but there is unlikely to be a binding post-Kyoto international
agreement accompanied by major collective action toward stopping, least
of all reversing, global warming.
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Despite all the new theory that has been developed since Olson's
treatise on collective action, his classical theory remains extremely useful in
explaining the failure so far of the climate regime, and it may be equally
useful in predicting future cooperation. Olson's CAT suggests that an
effective climate regime is an unlikely prospect, at least until the impacts of
climate change become much more pronounced. As Young argued quite
some time ago (but it is as true today as it was when he said it), "Talk of a
creeping crisis with regard to global warming simply cannot produce the
impact of the exogenous shocks.. .as a force in breaking the logjams that
commonly arise in institutional bargaining. This is no doubt frustrating to
those working on a number of important collective-action problems,"145
including climate change. Until then, adaptation may be the preferred
strategy of many states.
Olson said that selective incentives, separate from the good being
sought, must be provided to bring about collective action. 4 6 This elegantly
and simply explains Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in late 2004:
Despite ongoing domestic debates about whether ratification would benefit
Russia or hurt it, Europe's willingness to trade support for Russian
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for ratification of the
protocol provided the necessary incentive. 147 The added incentives of the
prestige, respect, and status that WTO membership could bring, as well as
moving Russia closer to the European market, could only help induce its
accession to the agreement. It also does not hurt that Russia really does not
need to do much at all to meet its Kyoto commitments and likely will profit
handsomely from emissions trading. But incentives necessary to bring other
countries on board are few. Relative to the need for emissions cuts, as well
as the scale of resistance to action in countries most important to the regime
but which are resistant to limiting, let alone cutting, their emissions (i.e., the
United States and large developing countries such as China, India, and
Brazil), the disincentives to joining, namely the costs to extant economic
interests and institutions, is perceived to be much greater than any incentive
to cut GHG emissions drastically. In the cases of the large developing
economies, much larger "side payments," alongside creative disincentives
(e.g., trade restrictions like those used in the context of the Montreal
Protocol), are required to entice them to limit future emissions. The Clean
Development Mechanism and climate fund designed to help implement the
Kyoto Protocol are puny relative to the enticements of aggressive, energyintensive economic growth.
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The Montreal Protocol and Med Plan successes relative to the
climate regime fit the logic of CAT. In each case, a large latent group of
states was mobilized to undertake collective action to achieve a common
good. Both have made real progress toward their objectives. It was those
states with the greatest economic and diplomatic resources that worked
most vigorously toward collective action. For example, in the case of the
Med Plan, France played this important role: "Because of its dominant
position, France was able to take, and did take, a leadership role in the early
phase of the Med Plan .... During the early years of the program the greatest
national contributions came from France; without this support the program
would not have gotten off the ground."" In the case of the Montreal
Protocol, the United States took on the leadership role, pushing other states
to act on its proposals to limit ODCs (albeit to benefit U.S. producers of CFC
alternatives).'4 9 Conversely, in the case of climate change, the United States
recently tried to veto more aggressive action, and Europe's leadership lacks
vitality. Things would be worse without European efforts to lead on the
issue, but collective action necessary to genuinely address climate change
needs much more leadership than any states have displayed so far. If
Europe wants to continue leading, and to see genuine results from the
leadership, it will have to work much harder. It must move forthrightly to
adopt even more aggressive policies that set a powerful example for the
world, not least the United States, despite the costs, while also encouraging
through its trade and economic policies climate-friendly production beyond
its borders.
If more robust European leadership is forthcoming, it is possible
that other states, along with their peoples, will increasingly define their
national interests in terms of protecting the common atmospheric good and
not being part of (or being seen as being part of) the unfair and harmful
despoiling of that good.'-5 Scientific assessments suggesting that global
warming could lead, paradoxically, to drastic temperature decreases in
Europe may provide a stimulus for more European concern and action.15
The question is whether such a "reconstruction" of national interests,
arguably underway among European Union members, will bear fruit in
time. In this regard, one must tend toward pessimism. Things are expected
to get much worse, not only because the scientists tell us change is
inevitable no matter what is done now, but because the amount of action
required to put a major dent in the problem- on the order of at least 60 to
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70 percent cuts in GHGs5 2 - is simply not going to happen anytime soon - if
even in our lifetimes. The cost of adaptationis - rightly or wrongly, correctly
or not - viewed by the United States and some other rich states, and many
not-so-rich ones, as being lower than robust action to cut GHG pollutants.5 3
Besides much stronger leadership, what would increase the
likelihood of effective international collective action on climate change?
CAT suggests a number of variables that need to change. Knowledge and
information are essential in this case. Scientists should of course continue
trying to improve our understanding of global warming and resulting
climate change, and they should continue to actively cooperate to persuade
governments of the importance of acting on their findings as well as
working with nongovernmental organizations and the media to educate the
public and policy makers. But knowledge brokers should not be neutral
(after all, those who oppose action have not been neutral); they should
consciously and systematically endeavor to show governments that national
interests are harmed by inaction. It needs to be demonstrated that
governments are shirking their most basic duty of defending the national
interest by not acting aggressively to combat this problem. Improved
science and more news coverage are starting to have an effect, as noted
earlier. In the United States, for example, local municipalities and some
state governments are implementing laws and regulations to limit GHG
emissions, having recognized that the federal government is not doing
enough."
Furthermore, the notion of costs can be reinterpreted: the cost of
inaction exceeds the cost of action. This of course requires careful
consideration of those economic sectors most affected by the necessary
transition away from fossil-fuel intensive economies. This will be terribly
difficult, but there is still too little focus by governments and the media on
the economic advantages of transitioning to the genuine move "beyond
petroleum" (to borrow one oil company's slogan). Alongside this is the
equally difficult effort to create new incentives for action by the developing
world, starting with the world's wealthy countries reducing their GHG
emissions and providing much more financial assistance to developing
countries. Without this action by the developed countries to fulfill their
common but differentiated responsibilities associated with climate change,
the developing world will continue to follow their bad example.
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Doing these things is obviously tremendously difficult; otherwise
there would be more movement already. Looking on the bright side,
international collective action to address environmental problems has been
proved doable by the evolution of a number of international regimes, such
as those manifested in the Montreal Protocol and the Med Plan. Classical
CAT shows which criteria should be met before similar success can be
achieved in the case of climate change. Unfortunately, the comparatively
favorable circumstances that obtained in the ozone and Mediterranean
cases - themselves difficult enough - are absent in the case of climate
change. The failure of the climate regime so far is "logical" from the
perspective of classical CAT. Thus, we would be well advised to prepare
ourselves to weather the effects of climate change and a future that will be
significantly different from the present. Sadly and shamefully -but not
surprisingly - climate change is here to stay.

